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ABSTRACT 
Dynamic game theory is applied to analyze the timber market in northern Iran as a duopsony. The Nash 
equilibrium and the dynamic properties of the system based on marginal adjustments are determined. 
When timber is sold, the different mills use mixed strategies to give sea led  bid s.  It is found  th at the 
decision probability combination of the different mills follow a special form of attractor and that centers 
should be expected to appear in unconstrained games. Since the probabilities of different strategies are 
always found in the interval [0,1], the boundaries of the feasible set are sometimes binding constraints. 
Then, the attractor becomes a constrained probability orbit. In the studied game, the probability that the 
Nash equilibrium will be reached is almost zero. The dynamic properties of timber prices derived via the 
duopsony game model are also found in the real empirical price series from the north of Iran. 
 
Keywords: Iranian forest industry, Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Constrained probability orbit. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The forest sector is important to the 
economy of northern Iran. A rather small 
number of large mills dominate the industry 
in the region. The analysis in this paper is 
made with the ambition to describe the 
market structure and to analyze the dynamic 
properties of the market. The study also 
focuses on the theory of duopsony games. 
The dynamics of such games, in particular 
with conditions typical in the region, will be 
studied and compared to real empirical data 
series. 
Hence, dynamic game theory will be 
applied to analyze the timber market in 
northern Iran as a duopsony. When timber is 
sold, the different mills use mixed strategies 
to give sealed bids. The Nash equilibrium 
and the dynamic properties of the system 
based on marginal adjustments will be 
determined.  
Game theory is a branch of mathematical 
analysis developed to study decision making 
in situations of conflict (and sometimes 
cooperation). Such situations exist when two 
or more decision makers (player) have 
different objectives, act on the same system 
or share the same resources. Game theory 
provides a mathematical process for selecting 
an optimal strategy (that is, an optimum 
decision or a sequence of decisions) in the 
face of an opponent who has a strategy of his 
own. In game theory, these assumptions are 
usually made: 
•  Each player has two or more 
strategies or specific choices. 
•  Different possible combinations of 
strategies available give different 
payoffs to the different players. 
•  In some games, the players have 
perfect information about the game. 
This is not always the case. In some 
games, the information is not perfect 
and symmetrical. 
Game theory has applications in a variety 
of fields including operation research, Game theory application to Iranian forest industry   60
economics, political sciences, military 
strategy, psychology and biology. It has close 
links with economics in that it seeks to find 
rational strategies in situations where the 
outcome depends not only on one's own 
strategy and "market conditions", but also 
upon the strategies chosen by other players 
with possibly different or overlapping goals. 
Some typical market situations to be 
handled within this framework in economics 
are oligopolies and oligopsonies, in particu- 
lar duopolies and duopsonies.  
A game can be classified on the basis of 
several criteria. Depend on the number of 
players, we may have two-person, three –
person or n-person games. 
Depending on the payoff situation a game 
can be classified as either constant-sum or 
nonconstant-sum. A constant sum game can 
be classified as a zero-sum or non-zero-sum 
games. In a zero-sum game the sum of 
payoffs at the end is zero since the amounts 
won or lost are equal. In such games, each 
player knows exactly how the other player is 
affected by different decision combinations 
as long as he knows how he is affected by the 
combinations himself. As an economic 
example of this, we may consider two firms 
in a duopolistic market that are striving to 
increase the number of customers. If the total 
number of customers is constrained, the 
number of customers won by one firm must 
be identical to the number of customers lost 
by the other. 
In many real games, the information is 
incomplete. Player A does not know exactly 
how player B is affected by different decision 
combinations without a lot of special 
information concerning the (economic or 
maybe physical or biological) environment of 
player B. Most economic situations are non-
zero-sum. In many cases, it is necessary to 
calculate the optimal behaviour of each 
player for each possible position in the 
physical state space and speed vector for 
each possible position, speed vector, and the 
decision of the other players. The problem is 
then solved recursively in the spirit of 
dynamic programming for every player 
conditional on the behaviour of all other 
players. In fact, in a two-person differente 
game, if the decisions of player B or their 
probability distribution are known by player 
A and the decisions made by player B are not 
affected by the decisions made by player A, 
then player A may regard his optimization 
problem in the differente game as a common 
dynamic programming problem. This how- 
ever, is a very special case where we do not 
really investigate the game anymore. We 
then have a “game against nature”. While the 
dimensionality problem in dynamic progr- 
amming is well known. In different games, 
the dimensionality problem is much worse. 
So, what can be done? 
If we accept low resolution in the state, 
time space and a low number of possible 
decisions (controls), then the differente 
games can often rapidly be solved. Furth- 
ermore we usually have to assume that the 
game is deterministic: each player selects a 
pure position dependent strategy. If we let 
the players use randomized strategies, make 
different decisions with different proba- 
bilities in different situations, the comp- 
utation time will grow very rapidly. One 
observation concerning the deterministic 
differential or differente game is that the 
outcome is known when the initial 
conditions are known. In a deterministic 
differential game, each player knows exactly 
what to do and what the other players will 
do in every possible situation. There is really 
no need to play a game. For these reasons we 
may say that we know the outcome of a 
game. Of course in reality, the players do not 
know enough, or have enough time to 
calculate optimal decisions in all possible 
positions. In real world conflicts, the 
technical properties of equipment and exact 
positions of any army units may be unknown 
by the opponent. In other kinds of conflicts in 
a complicated society, the options available 
to the opponent are frequently very difficult 
to estimate. 
In many economics real world games, the 
physical and economic environments of the 
game's problems change rapidly and often 
unpredictably. For example a player may 
own a factory that produces a particular 
product. If the price of the product is high, 
then the player may be very interested in 
buying a unit of a particular input factor. 
This input factor transaction may be a game 
where the factory owner participates among 
other potential buyers. In this case, the 
factory owner will highly valuate a decision 
combination, which means that he can buy 
the input factor. One month later, the price of 
the product decreases dramatically. Again, Mohammadi Limaei & Lohmander  61
the factory participates in a similar 
transaction game. This time he does not 
valuate a decision combination, which makes 
him buy the input factor as highly as before. 
Since the economic environment 
unpredictably changes in this game, we 
cannot expect that the players will select the 
same strategy forever. Hence, we cannot be 
sure that a player who estimates the 
probabilities of the other player’s decisions 
via frequencies in a complete historical 
decision observation series Thusly, 
optimizing his strategy and expected result 
in the changing environment, accordingly. 
In this paper, dynamic game theory is 
applied to the Iranian forest industry. 
Presently, there are two sawmill firms 
actively involved in the timber market area 
of the game. A large number of forest 
companies and privately planted forests sell 
timber to these sawmills. In each transaction, 
both sawmills (players) gives a sealed bid: 
either high or a low. In this example, the 
situation is a non-cooperative game. Our first 
aim is to determine the optimal strategy and 
Nash equilibrium for each player.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cournot (1838) presented a revolutionary 
contribution to the theory of non-cooperative 
equilibria in oligopoly situations. Von 
Stackelberg (1934 and 1938) contributed to 
game theory before the concept was 
established, particularly dynamic duopoly 
theory.  
The mathematical theory of games was 
described by Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944). Nash (1950) gave us the important 
concept named the Nash equilibrium. In the 
Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive 
to deviate from the strategy chosen, since no 
player can choose a better strategy given   
the choices of the other players. Nash 
equilibrium has been very useful in most 
developments of game theory. Brown and 
von Neumann (1950) discussed the usage of 
differential equations in the solution of the 
games. Robinson (1951) used an iteration 
method where each player sequentially 
estimated the probability distributions of the 
other players decisions while optimally 
adapting their on decision probabilities. 
Bellman (1953) continued the study of 
iterative algorithms as did von Neumann 
(1954). Luce and Raffia (1957) studied many 
important game problems with mathematics 
and numerical methods. Schelling (one of the 
winners of the prize in economic sciences in 
memory of Alfred Nobel 2005) continued a 
good survey of the field of conflict strategy in 
1960. Dresher (1961) stressed time 
dimensions and optimal decisions over time 
in connection with several games of conflict. 
Selten (1975), Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) 
and Rasmusen (1990) presented a wide 
spectrum of game models from economics 
and related fields. Aumann and Hart (1992, 
1994 and 2002) represent three volumes of a 
useful handbook of game theory with 
economic applications (Aumann was the 
other winner of the prize in economic 
sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel 2005). 
Dynamic games were studied by Flåm (1990, 
1996, 1999 and 2002) and Flåm and Zaccour 
(1991).  
In recent years, game theory has found 
new applications in the forest sector. 
Lohmander (1994) studied the dynamics and 
non cooperative decisions in stochastic 
markets with pulp industry application. 
Lohmander (1997) contains a general 
investigation of the constrained probability 
orbit of mixed strategy games with marginal 
adjustment. A general two person non-zero 
sum game with zero as a special case is 
analyzed. A doupsony application where 
two sawmills are competing in the timber 
market is included and the dynamic 
properties of the system are determined. 
Koskela & Ollikainen (1998) studied a game 
theoretic model of timber prices in the 
Finnish pulp and paper industry. They 
considered the special sets of the hypotheses 
concerning the determination of timber price 
and quantity via negotiations. Carter and 
Newman (1998) examined the impact of 
reservation prices on timber revenues from 
United States governmental timber sale 
auctions in North Carolina from a game-
theoretic perspective by recognizing the 
effects of competition on optimal bid 
strategies. 
 
COOPERATION OR CONFLICT IN 
TIMBER MARKET: A DOUP- 
SONY DISCUSSION 
Two sawmills buy timber from a large 
number of independent forest owners in an 
area. Every time a unit of timber is available, 
the forest owner receives bids from the Game theory application to Iranian forest industry   62
potential buyers. Clearly, this is a case where 
the buyers as a group may benefit from 
cooperation and low bids. The extra profit 
obtained via the low timber price may then 
be distributed between the buyers in some 
way. In some cases, the strongest sawmill (in 
the sense of ability to survive high timber 
prices)  may prefer not to cooperate and to 
destroy the input market of other sawmill via 
high bids). In  this way, both sawmills loose 
profits during some time period and the 
strongest sawmill has the option to use his 
monopsony power and to increase his profits 
even more than before via low timber prices. 
The sawmill example contains two kinds of 
solutions:  
In the cooperation case, we may expect the 
sawmills to calculate the timber price which 
maximizes the profit of the two sawmills as a 
group. Then, they distribute the extra profit 
somehow within the group. Sometimes we 
may expect that the sawmills decide not only 
the timber price but also the distribution of 
the timber. The forest owners may not notice 
this cooperation directly. They may notice 
that all bids are low, or that only one of the 
saw mills gives a bid on each unit of timber, 
or finally, that one sawmill gives a low bid 
and the other sawmill gives a very low bid 
on each timber unit. In the latest case, the 
very low bid is just to hide the cooperation 
from the sellers. It does not affect the plan of 
buyers anyway. In timber price fight case, the 
timber price bids are high until one of the 
buyers leaves the market. Then, the bids 
instantly fall and the low price level remains 
until increased competition appears. In a 
third case, the buyers do not cooperate 
because they do not believe that other buyers 
will keep an agreement. Maybe they are also 
aware that the government will discover 
market cooperation and punish cartels. 
Hence, the buyers act according to the law 
and sometimes deliver sealed bids (Some 
countries have such laws). When they decide 
to give a bid, they first have to inform 
themselves about the quality of the timber 
and other practical details. This activity is not 
costless. Then, they have to decide the level 
of the bid. Of course, they can give a low bid 
and hope that the other sawmill will not give 
a higher bid. In that case they will buy the 
timber cheaply. If they have bad luck, the 
other sawmill will buy the timber with a 
higher bid and the only economics 
consequence of the activity will be the cost of 
the investigation. On the other hand, they 
may give a high bid and hope that the other 
sawmill will give a lower bid. The probability 
of obtaining the timber is of course higher in 
this case, but the price is higher as well. 
This last version of the game is interesting 
in several ways and the methodology to be 
used in the analysis is not obvious. Each 
player has, for instance, two different 
possible decisions: A high (H) or a low (L) 
bid. The players are denoted A and B. If the 
sum of the total profit made by the two 
players is zero (or a constant), it is obvious 
that no cooperation will appear.  If the 
players know all the economic consequences 
for both players of all decision combinations 
exactly, then we can use the two person zero 
sum game theory. The optimal strategies 
may turn out to be pure (only one decision) 
or mixed for each player where a mixed 
strategy means that different decision should 
be made with different probabilities. In the 
sense that one sawmill has no (or very 
limited) information concerning the eco- 
nomic consequences in the other sawmill 
with different decision combinations, the 
obvious way for player A to deal with the 
problem is to observe and estimate the 
frequencies of the different decision taken by 
player B. 
 
Timber price (numerical data analysis) 
Numerical data was collected from two 
forest companies in the north of Iran, named 
Shafarod and Neka Chub (Fig 1). As they buy 
more than 70 percent of the timber in the 
region. We may call this as a duopsony 
situation. These companies rent some forests 
from the government. They harvest and 
manage these rented forests, but also buy 
timber from other source, such as privately 
planted forests and forest companies. These 
companies produce different products in 
their own sawmills, such as sawnwood, 
veneer, plywood, pulpwood, firewood and 
charcoal. Shafarod and Neka Chub sawmills 
are respectively denoted as A and B. 
 
 
Fig 1. The distribution of Iranian northern forests and 
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The real timber price series from the year 
1990 to 2004 were collected from the two 
sawmills. Appendix A and Fig. 2 show these 
series. The difference of the real timber prices 
shown in Fig 3.  
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Fig 2. Real timber prices of two sawmills in the north 
of Iran. 
 
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1990 1994 1998 2002
year
€
/
m
3
Timber price
differences
betwwen two
sawmills
(€/m3)
 
Fig 3. The difference between real timber prices 
between two sawmills in the north of Iran.   
As a start, In order to investigate timber 
price processes of the two mills, we first 
investigate the prices using autoregressive 
(AR) time series analysis. 
Timber prices are treated as stochastic and 
are assumed to follow a first order Markov 
process. A Markov price expectation stru- 
cture refers to any stochastic model where 
price is conditional on the previous prices. 
Current prices are known, but the future 
prices are uncertain. 
Fifteen years of timber price data were 
used to estimate the following model:   
Pt+1  =  α   +β Pt  +  ε t+1,  where  Pt+1  is the 
expected price in period t+1, Pt is price in the 
current period and  ε t+1 is the error term. 
ε t+1 is assumed to be independent identical 
distribution, and Gaussian with expected 
value of  0 and standard deviation of
1 + t ε σ . 
The estimated parameters α ,β  are found 
below: (t statistics in parentheses). 
Sawmill A: 
1 1 678 . 0 394 . 23 + + + + = t t t P P ε    (1) 
             (1.727)     (3.496)              . 880 . 8
1 =
+ t ε σ  
Sawmill B: 
1 1 667 . 0 915 . 23 + + + + = t t t P P ε    (2) 
             (1.808)      (3.518)          . 422 . 8
1 =
+ t ε σ  
The parameter estimates of the two first 
order AR price processes give low t-values. 
Hence, some alternative models could be 
more appropriate. As a start, we investigate 
the price difference.  
The first order AR model for the timber 
price differences between the two sawmills, 
_
,, tt A t B P PP =− is: 
1 1 084 . 0 368 . 0 + + + + = t t P P ε    (3) 
            (0.325)    (0.273)            . 231 . 4
1 =
+ t ε σ  
Also the second order AR process for 
timber price differences was estimated: 
t t t t P P P ε δ β α + + + = − − 2 1    (4) 
t t t t P P P ε + − − − = − − 2 1 30816 . 0 01548 . 0 22369 . 0
           (-0.1759)   (-0.04678)        (-0.93313) 
. 386796 . 4 =
t ε σ  
We observe that the first and second order 
AR models of the price differences give very 
low t-values. Such models do not seem to 
capture the properties and possible depen- 
dencies of the prices very well. The mean of 
the price process difference according to the 
second order AR model can be calculated: 
eq eq eq P P P δ β α + + =  or  α δ β = − − eq P ) 1 (  and 
.
) 1 ( δ β
α
− −
= eq P      ( 5 )  
Using the estimated parameter values, we get 
the mean of the price process €. 1690 . 0 − = eq P  
So, if we use the second order process, 
even if it gives low t-values, it indicates that 
the expected long run difference between the 
prices in the two mills is very low. This is 
what we can also find if we investigate the 
price differences shown in Fig 3. 
Maybe we could find a stronger relation if 
we estimate the prices of the two mills as a 
function of the earlier prices in both mills. 
1 , , 1 , + + + + + = t t B B t A A A t A P P P ε β β α  (6) 
where  
t B t A t A P P P , , 1 , 952 . 0 177 . 0 148 . 16 − − = +  
                (1.249)     (-0.283)         (1.501) 
. 562 . 8
1 =
+ t ε σ  
and 
1 , , 1 , + + + + + = t t A A t B B B t B P P P ε β β α  (7) 
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1 , , 1 , 997 . 0   0.280   -   19.774 + + + + = t t A t B t B P P P ε  
               (1.470)    (-0.431)        (1.511)   
. 907 . 8
1 =
+ t ε σ  
Again, we observe that the models give very 
low t-values. Some other approaches are 
needed. 
We may also run the following regressions: 
A t B A A P P dP , 3 2 1 ε α α α + + + =  (8) 
Where  A dP  is defined as t A t A P P , 1 , − + . 
B t B A B P P dP , 6 5 4 ε α α α + + + =  (9) 
B dP is  t B t B P P , 1 , − +  
Table 1 shows the results of these 
regressions. 
We conclude this section with the 
following observations: The AR process 
estimations of different types gave low t-
values. The two price processes seem to be 
stationary, but no definite results were 
obtained in this way. Hence, we move to a 
dynamic game theory approach and seek to 
interpret our empirical findings in this way. 
 
EXPECTED PAYOFF AND NASH 
EQUILIBRIUM 
The profit in each mill may be calculated 
by the following function: 
T T P P S S V P V P V P F − + + − = π    (10) 
Where  π  is net profit, F is fix production 
cost,  T P is timber price,  S P  is net sawnwood 
price,  P P  is net pulpwood price,  S V  is 
volume of sawnwood production,  P V  is 
volume of pulpwood production, and  T V  is 
purchased timber volume.  
Below, we ignored fix cost because it has 
the same effect on the two sawmills. We 
assume that from 1.2 m3 timber it is possible 
to produce 1 m3 sawnwood and pulpwood 
(0.7 m3 sawnwood and 0.3 m3 pulpwood). 
We may rewrite equation 10 as: 
V P VP VP T P S 2 . 1 3 . 0 7 . 0 − + = π  (11) 
Where V is the sum of sawnwood and 
pulpwood ) ( P S V V V + = . 
Sawmill A has higher capacity than sawmill 
B. Both mills are located close to the forest, 
about 500 km away from each other. 
Independent forest harvesters and privately 
planted forests sell their timber to these two 
sawmills.  
Here the situation is a non-cooperative game. 
Each sawmill uses a mixed strategy and gives 
a high or a low bid. Compare Table 2.  
We determine the elements of the profit 
(payoff) matrix in this way: 
Using the empirical data (Fig 2), we 
determine the profits of these mills under 
two different price levels. 
In case the timber price is high: 
Ps = 110 (€/m3), Pp = 20 (€/m3), PT  = 
65(€/m3), V=1 m3 
If we substitute these values into equation 11, 
the profit is 5 €/ m3 
In case the timber price is low:  
Ps = 110 (€/m3), Pp = 20 (€/m3), PT  =55 
(€/m3), V=1 m3 
By substituting these values into equation 11, 
the profit is 17 €/ m3. 
Let us determine the Nash equilibrium: 
The expected payoff of mill A is: 
) 1 )( 1 ( 15 ) 1 ( 19 ) 1 ( 17 85 . 17 Y X X Y Y X XY EA − − + − + − + =  (12) 
XY Y X E A 15 . 3 4 2 15 − + + =    (13) 
sawmill A is interested if it is profitable to 
increase or decrease X. 
0 15 . 3 2 / = − = Y X E A δ δ    (14) 
From this, we conclude that sawmill A has 
no reason to change X if Y = 0.634 
The expected payoff of sawmill B is: 
) 1 )( 1 ( 5 . 12 ) 1 ( 9 . 11 ) 1 ( 14 3 . 15 Y X X Y Y X XY EB − − + − + − + =  (15) 
XY Y X E B 9 . 1 6 . 0 5 . 1 5 . 12 + − + =  (16) 
Sawmill B is interested to know if it is 
profitable to increase or decrease Y. 
0 9 . 1 6 . 0 / = + − = X Y E B δ δ    (17) 
Hence, sawmill B has no reason to change Y 
if X = 0.316. 
The mixed Nash equilibrium is (NX, NY) = 
(0.316, 0.634) 
With the mixed Nash equilibrium values 
of NX and NY we determine the expected 
payoffs of mills A and B:  EA = 1753708 € and 
EB = 1313382 €  
 
Table 1. Parameters based on the timber price data. 
  1 α   2 α   3 α   4 α   4 α   6 α   A t, ε
 
B t, ε  
Parameter  value  16.148 0.952  -1.177 19.774 -0.003 -0.280    
Standard  deviation  12.933  0.634 0.625 13.454  0.660 0.650 8.562 8.907 
t-  statistics  1.249  1.501  -1.883 1.470  -0.005 -0.431    
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Table 2. The payoff matrix for two sawmills.X= the 
probability of the low timber price of mill A. (1-X) = 
the probability of the high timber price of mill A. Y= 
the probability of the low timber price of mill B. (1-Y) 
= the probability of the high timber price of mill B. 
 Y    (1-Y) 
 V A = 126     (1.)  VA =  120 
 V B = 108  VB = 336 
X  PA = 55 PA = 55 
 P B = 55  PB = 65 
  π A= 17.85   (2.)  π A = 17.00 
  π B= 15.30  π B =  14.00 
 V A = 456  VA = 360 
 V B = 84  VB = 300 
(1-X)  PA = 65  PA = 65 
 P B = 55  PB = 65 
  π A = 19.00  π A = 15.00 
  π B = 11.90  π B = 12.50 
1. V is the timber volume (1000 m3). 
2. π  is the net profit (100000 €). 
 
Hence, we realize that both mills expect to 
get these payoffs if both buy the timber 
according to the mixed Nash equilibrium. 
 
DYNAMICS OF THE MIXED 
STRATEGY GAME 
As previously mentioned, it is not likely 
that the managers of the two mills have 
complete information concerning the 
properties of the other mills. The costs and 
revenues of the competitor are not perfectly 
known. However, mixed strategy frequencies 
are observed. Now, we introduce the 
dynamic rules of the game: 
Each mill continuously observes the 
frequencies of the other mills action.  
Expected marginal profits ( X E A δ δ /  
and  Y E B δ δ / ) are calculated based on this 
information. In case the marginal profit of 
mill A is strictly positive (zero or strictly 
negative), mill A increases (leaves unch- 
anged, decreases) X. In case the marginal 
profit of mill B is strictly positive (zero or 
strictly negative), mill B increases (leaves 
unchanged, decreases) Y. We assume that the 
speed of adjustment (of X and Y) is 
proportional to the expected marginal 
profits. Further, both mills A and B have the 
similar relations between the speed of 
adjustment and expected marginal profit. We 
assume that W1  and W2 are the speed of 
adjustment for mills A and B respectively 
and W1=W2. 
We may rewrite the Eq. 14 as: 
) / ( 1 X E W X A δ δ = &    (18) 
or  ) 15 . 3 2 ( 1 Y W X − = &    (19) 
We can rewrite the Eq. 17 as: 
) / ( 2 Y E W Y B δ δ = &    (20) 
or  ) 9 . 1 6 . 0 ( 2 X W Y + − = &  (21) 
The resulted mixed strategy trajectories are 
found in Fig 4. 
 
 
Fig 4. The dynamics of mixed strategy probabilities of 
the timber game.  
 
We can make the following observations in 
Fig 4. 
The trajectories found in Fig 4 show possible 
time paths of the strategy combination (X, Y).  
 
Region a: 
X>0.316, Y<0.634. Sawmill A often gives a 
low bids, and sawmill B often gives a high 
bids. Since sawmill A frequently gives a low 
bid, sawmill B finds it profitable to increase 
the frequency of low, so he decides to give 
low bids more often and the system moves 
upwards , to the right and soon reaches the 
region b. 
 
Region b: 
X>0.316, Y>0.634. Both mills often give 
low bids. Sawmill A realizes that it profitable 
if he increases the frequency of high bids, so 
he gives high bids more often and the system 
moves upwards and to the left reaching 
region c. 
 
Region c: 
X<0.316, Y>0.634. Sawmill A often gives 
high bids, and sawmill B often gives low 
bids. B finds that it profitable to give high bid Game theory application to Iranian forest industry   66
more often and the system moves down 
reaching region d. 
 
Region d: 
X<0.316, Y<0.634. Sawmill B prefers to 
frequently give high bids. Sawmill A finds 
that it is profitable if he more often gives low 
bids. He decides to increase the frequency of 
low bids and the system is moved to the right 
reaching region a once again.  
 
FORMAL ANALYSIS OF DYNA- 
MICS 
In the following functions, and in 
appendix B, we use α  andβ . These 
parameters do not have the same interp- 
retation as in section 4. 
The aim is to show that mixed strategy 
probabilities follow the trajectories in Fig 4. 
The formal analysis of the differential 
equation system is found in Appendix B. 
Y X 1 1 β α + = &      (22) 
X Y 2 2 β α + = &      (23) 
The following assumptions are satisfied: 
) 0 ( 2 1 < β β ,  ) 0 ( 1 1 < β α ,   ) 0 ( 2 2 < β α  
The solution is: 
X (t) = A1 cos(θ  t) + A2 sin(θ  t )+ NX (24) 
Y (t) = A3 cos(θ  t) + A4 sin(θ  t )+ NY (25) 
(NX, NY) is the Nash Equilibrium and  
= X N -
2
2
β
α ,  = Y N -
1
1
β
α . 
X(0)= X0 , Y(0)= Y0 , A1= X0+
2
2
β
α  
A2=
θ
β 3 1A , A3= Y0+
1
1
β
α , A4=
θ
β 1 2 A , 
2 1β β θ − = . 
The trajectories X(t) and Y(t) are shown in 
Fig. 5 and 6. 
(X(t), Y(t)) will follow an orbit around the 
Nash equilibrium (NX, NY). This is called a 
center in the theory of dynamical systems. 
 
 
Fig 5. The dynamics of the mixed strategy probabilities 
of the timber game for two players A and B.  
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Fig 6. The probability path of the mixed strategy 
timber game. 
 
As such, we may now determine expected 
price and profits, as well as marginal profit 
for the two players. A simulation model 
programmed in Lingo found in Appendix C 
was used to determine these values. The 
results show the dynamics of the expected 
prices and profits, as well as expected 
marginal profits for each player.  
Fig. 7 shows how the expected price 
difference change for two players when the 
high and low price offers are 65 and 55 €/m3 
respectively and W1=W2=1 for both players. 
Now, it is time to recall the price differences 
found in the real world as stated in Fig. 3. To 
obtain a price differences path similar to the 
empirical data found in Fig. 3, we consider a 
price difference of 15 €/m3 between high and 
low bids and W1=W2=1 for both players. We 
assume that the Nash equilibrium is still the 
same as in the case with high and low prices 
of 65 €/m3 and 55 €/m3 respectively. Now; 
however, we assume that, for different 
reasons, there are differences between the 
two areas where the two mills A and B are 
located. A high price is 4 €/m3 higher in the 
area of mill B than in the area of mill A. This 
is quite reasonable, since there may be all 
kinds of local reasons why the conditions are 
different. We do not have documented 
reasons for such possible differences in cost 
and revenue background data, however. 
Now, we determine θ  so that the period of 
the system fits the empirical data. The period 
is four years according to the data found in 
Fig 3. It means that 
4
2Π =θ , which gives θ  
= 1.57. 
 
DYNAMIC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF 
TIMBER MARKET GAME 
Now, we will partially modify the initial 
Nash equilibrium to investigate the behavior 
of each sawmill under these new assump- 
tions. Mohammadi Limaei & Lohmander  67
 
Fig 7. The expected price difference path with the first 
game model version. 
 
 
Fig 8. The expected price difference path when the 
parameters have been adapted to fit the empirical price 
difference data. 
 
Case 1: 
According to the duopsony game form- 
ulated above. 
Equilibrium: (NX, NY) = (0.316, 0.634). 
Illustration: Fig. 4 and 5. 
 
Case 2: 
We assume that the equilibrium is (NX, 
NY) = (0.5, 0.5). In this situation, A and B will 
have equal probability to participate in the 
game with high or low bids.  
Illustration: Fig. 9. 
 
Case 3: 
We assume that the equilibrium is   
(NX, NY) = (0.7, 0.3). 
Compared to case 1, the probability that A 
gives high bids decreased and low bid 
increased. In this case the probability that B 
gives high bids increased and low bids 
decreased. Illustration: Fig 10.  
According to our investigation we may 
write the following observations: 
•  Each player optimizes his expected 
payoff via a mixed strategy condit- 
ionally on the decision frequencies of 
the other player. In the mixed 
strategies, every decision should 
have a strictly positive probability. 
•  The differential equation system 
governing the simultaneous optimal 
adjustments of the decision frequ- 
encies of the two players give cyclical 
solutions. 
•  The Nash equilibrium solution, (NX, 
NY) = (0.316, 0.634), will never be 
reached unless that happens to be the 
initial state of the system. 
•  If the system follows a trajectory, an 
orbit or a center that passes through 
the four different regions without 
touching the boundary of the feasible 
area, then the system will follow this 
orbit forever. 
•  If the system follows a trajectory that 
somewhere touches the boundary of 
the feasible area, then the system will 
follow the boundary for some time. 
Finally, the system will start to 
follow an attractor, a center, forever. 
This attractor will be the largest 
center that can be constructed 
around the equilibrium without 
touching the boundaries, which is 
consistent with unconstrained 
differential equations. Note that most 
of the small circles in Fig 4 have been 
trapped forever in the respective 
attractors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The real timber price data was collected 
from two sawmills in the northern part of 
Iran where all of industrial forests are 
located. These mills buy more than 70% of 
the timber in the area. The timber prices at 
both mills change over time. Our motivation 
in this paper was to investigate such price 
variations. First we made a time series 
analysis, but we could not find 
understandable results in this manner. For 
this reason we defined and studied a 
dynamic dopsony game model of the timber 
market, thusly the trajectories of the decision 
probability combination were investigated. It 
was found that a large number of initial 
conditions made the decision probability 
combination follow a special form of 
attractor, such that centers can be expected to 
appear in typical games. Thus, the 
probability that the Nash equilibrium will be 
reached is almost zero. Game theory application to Iranian forest industry   68
Real world games are complicated. 
Hopefully, the reader found this analysis to 
be a step in the right direction. When we 
encounter a real-life game, where the players 
use mixed strategies and change the 
frequencies over time, we find indication that 
present theory is relevant. The properties of 
the empirical observations found in Fig. 3 
should be expected if our game model is 
relevant, as shown in the corresponding 
model result in Fig. 7. Finally, our 
interpretation is that the game model results 
closely match real world data. Since we have 
not found any other model that gives more 
realistic results, we conclude that our game 
approach may be the best choice. 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Real timber purchase price in two 
sawmills in north of Iran during 1990 to 2004. 
year 
Real timber 
price in 
Shafarod 
(€/m3) 
Real timber 
price in 
Neka Chub 
(€/m3) 
Timber price 
differences 
between two 
sawmills (€/m3) 
1990 59.61  56.77  2.84 
1991 53.03  50.67  2.36 
1992 56.77  52.04  4.73 
1993 50.79  53.87  -3.08 
1994 51.31  57.01  -5.70 
1995 53.41  57.22  -3.82 
1996 83.66  80.56  3.10 
1997 76.56  71.28  5.28 
1998 76.00  80.47  -4.47 
1999 78.19  74.47  3.72 
2000 79.35  82.65  -3.31 
2001 83.10  86.07  -2.97 
2002 78.17  76.89  1.28 
2003 72.04  69.82  2.22 
2004 70  64  6.00 
 
Appendix B:  Formal analysis of the dyn- 
amics: 
Y X 1 1 β α + = &
     ( 1 )  
X Y 2 2 β α + = &
     ( 2 )  
We assume ) 0 ( 2 1 < β β ,  ) 0 ( 1 1 < β α ,  ) 0 ( 2 2 < β α  
X & & = Y &
1 β  
) ( 2 2 1 X X β α β + = & &  
X X 2 1 2 1 β β α β + = & &
 and  2 1 2 1 α β β β = − X X & &
 (3) 
In general form we have 0 = − + b aX X & &  
where 2 1β β − = a  ,  2 1α β = b  
Homogenous solution of equation (3): 
0 = + aX X & &      ( 4 )  
Let X(t)=AeLt 
X & =LAeLt and  X & & = L2AeLt 
AeLt (L2 + a) =0 
2 1β β ± = L , i= 1 −  
Then  2 1β β − ± = L      (5) 
Particular solution of equation (3): 
X(t)=m+nt. 
X & =n and  X & & =0  by using this results in 
equation (4), we get: 
0+a (m+nt)=b 
n=0 then am=b and m=
a
b
 so we get 
2 1
2 1
β β
α β
−
+
= m  or 
2
2
β
α
− = m  
As a consequence, we have X(t)= Ae 
2 1β β − ±  i t + ) (
2
2
β
α
− ) 
Hence, 
2
2
2 1 2 2 1 1
0 )) sin( ) cos( ( ) (
β
α
β β β β − − + − = t A t A e t X
t  
or  
2
2
2 1 2 2 1 1 ) sin( ) cos( ) (
β
α
β β β β − − + − = t A t A t X  (6) 
X Y & & &
2 β =      ( 7 )  
By substituting equation (1) in equation (7) 
we get: 
) ( 1 1 2 Y Y β α β + = & &
 
Y Y 2 1 1 2 β β α β + = & &
 
1 2 2 1 α β β β = − Y Y& &
 
Finally, we get this solution: 
1
1
2 1 4 2 1 3 ) sin( ) cos( ) (
β
α
β β β β − − + − = t A t A t Y  (8) 
We define θ  as  2 1β β −    (9) 
We rewrite equations (6) and (8) like this: 
2
2
2 1 ) sin( ) cos( ) (
β
α
θ θ − + = t A t A t X  (10) 
1
1
4 3 ) sin( ) cos( ) (
β
α
θ θ − + = t A t A t Y  (11) 
The first order derivatives of these equations 
are: 
X & = -A1θ sin (θ  t) + A2θ  cos (θ t) (12) 
Y & = - A3θ  sin (θ  t) + A4θ  cos (θ t) (13) 
 
If we substitute equations (10) and (11) into 
equations (1) and (2), we have: Mohammadi Limaei & Lohmander  69
) ) sin( ) cos( (
1
1
4 3 1 1 β
α
θ θ β α − + + = t A t A X &  (14) 
) ) sin( ) cos( (
2
2
2 1 2 2 β
α
θ θ β α − + + = t A t A Y &  (15) 
After simplifying, we get: 
X & =  1 β  A3cos (θ t) +  1 β  A4sin (θ t) (16) 
Y & = 2 β  A1cos (θ t) +  2 β  A2sin (θ t) (17) 
From equations (12, 13) and (16, 17) we get 
the following equalities: 





 









 =
        
                                                             
A     =   A
A   =   A   -
  A   =   A
A -
1 2 4
2 2 3
3 1 2
4 1 1
β θ
β θ
β θ
β θ A
 (18) 
From equation (18), we get: 
3
4
2
1
A
A
A
A
− = , 
1
2
4
3
A
A
A
A
− = , 
θ
β 3 1
2
A
A = , 
1
2
3 β
θ A
A = , 
θ
β 1 2
4
A
A =    (19) 
Consequently, the following equations can be 
written: 



 


− + − =
− + =
1
1 1 2 2 2
2
2
2 1
) sin( ) ( ) cos( ) ( ) (
) sin( ) cos( ) (
β
α
θ
θ
β
θ
θ
β
β
α
θ θ
t
A
t
A
t Y
t A t A t X
 (20) 
or 



 


− + =
− + =
1
1 1 2
3
2
2 3 1
1
) sin( ) ( ) cos( ) (
) sin( ) ( ) cos( ) (
β
α
θ
θ
β
θ
β
α
θ
θ
β
θ
t
A
t A t Y
t
A
t A t X
 (21) 
Then: 
() ()
2
2
1
2
2
1 0 0
β
α
β
α
+ Χ = Α ⇒ − Α = Χ  
and 
1
1
3 ) 0 (
β
α
− = A Y  ⇒
1
1
3 ) 0 (
β
α
+ = Y A  
The Nash equilibrium values for X and Y are 
2
2
β
α
− = X N , 
1
1
β
α
− = Y N  respectively. 
 
Appendix C. The Lingo code is found below. 
Model: 
sets: 
time/1..60/:x,y,EA, EAd, EB, EBd, MA, MB, 
EPA, EPB, EPDIFF; 
endsets 
! Speed of adjustment coefficients; 
wA = 0.005; 
wB = 0.005; 
step = 0.1; 
! Initial conditions; 
x(1) = 0.35; 
y(1) = 0.50; 
! Parameters; 
PAM = 60; 
PAD = 5; 
PBM = 60; 
PBD = 5; 
SSawnw = 0.7; 
Spulpw = 1-SSawnw; 
Use = 1.2; 
PSawnw = 110; 
PPulpw = 20; 
! Calculations of profit per cubic metre 
finished; 
ProfPm3A_LOW = SSawnw*PSawnw + 
SPulpw*PPulpw - Use*(PAM-PAD); 
ProfPm3A_HIGH = SSawnw*PSawnw + 
SPulpw*PPulpw - Use*(PAM+PAD); 
ProfPm3B_LOW = SSawnw*PSawnw + 
SPulpw*PPulpw - Use*(PBM-PBD); 
ProfPm3B_HIGH = SSawnw*PSawnw + 
SPulpw*PPulpw - Use*(PBM+PBD); 
! Volume calculations; 
VolA_Alow_Blow = 105*Use; 
VolB_Alow_Blow = 90*Use; 
VolA_Alow_Bhigh = 100*Use; 
VolB_Alow_Bhigh = 280*Use; 
VolA_Ahigh_Blow = 380*Use; 
VolB_Ahigh_Blow = 70*Use; 
VolA_Ahigh_Bhigh = 300*Use; 
VolB_Ahigh_Bhigh = 250*Use; 
! Profit calculations; 
ProfA _ ll = ProfPm3A _ LOW*VolA _ Alow 
_ Blow/Use; 
ProfA _ lh = ProfPm3A _ LOW*VolA _ Alow 
_ Bhigh/Use; 
ProfA _ hl = ProfPm3A _ HIGH*VolA _ 
Ahigh _ Blow/Use; 
ProfA _ hh = ProfPm3A _ HIGH*VolA _ 
Ahigh _ Bhigh/Use; 
ProfB _ ll = ProfPm3B _ LOW*VolB _ Alow _ 
Blow/Use; 
ProfB _ lh = ProfPm3B _ HIGH*VolB _ Alow 
_ Bhigh/Use; 
ProfB _ hl = ProfPm3B _ LOW*VolB _ Ahigh 
_ Blow/Use; 
ProfB _ hh = ProfPm3B _ HIGH*VolB _ 
Ahigh _ Bhigh/Use; 
! Simulation of the system;  
! The expected profits per period for players 
A and B are denoted EA and EB; 
 EA(1) = 0; Game theory application to Iranian forest industry   70
 @FOR( time(t) | t#GT#1: EA(t) = ProfA_ll*x 
(t-1)*y(t-1) +ProfA_lh*x(t-1)*(1-y(t-1)) +ProfA 
_hl*(1-x(t-1))*y(t-1) +ProfA_hh*(1-x(t-1))*(1-y 
(t-1)) ) ; 
 EB(1) = 0; 
  @FOR( time(t) | t#GT#1: EB(t) = 
ProfB_ll*x(t-1)*y(t-1) +ProfB_lh*x(t-1)*(1-y(t-
1)) + ProfB_hl*(1-x(t-1))*y(t-1) + ProfB_hh*(1-
x(t-1))*(1-y(t-1)) ) ; 
! The expected profits per period for players 
A and B are changed by EAd and EBd if X or 
Y is increased by 0.001; 
d = 0.001; 
 EAd(1) = 0; 
  @FOR(time(t) | t#GT#1: EAd(t) = ProfA 
_ll*(x(t-1)+d)*y(t-1) + ProfA_lh*(x(t-1)+d)*(1-
y(t-1)) + ProfA_hl*(1-x(t-1)-d)*y(t-1)  
ProfA_hh*(1-x(t-1)-d)*(1-y(t-1)) ) ; 
EBd(1) = 0; 
  @FOR( time(t) | t#GT#1: EBd(t) = 
ProfB_ll*x(t-1)*(y(t-1)+d) + ProfB_lh*x(t-1)* 
(1-y(t-1)-d) + ProfB_hl*(1-x(t-1))*(y(t-1)+d) + 
ProfB_hh*(1-x(t-1))*(1-y(t-1)-d)); 
 
! The marginal expected profits per period 
for players A and B are MA and MB if X or Y 
are increased; 
@FOR( time(t) | t#GT#1: MA(t) = (EAd(t) - 
EA(t))/d ); 
 @FOR( time(t) | t#GT#1: MB(t) = (EBd(t) - 
EB(t))/d ); 
@for(time(t): @FREE(MA(t))); 
@for(time(t): @FREE(MB(t))); 
! Now, X and Y are increased (or decreased) 
in case MA and MB are positive (negative); 
  @FOR( time(t) | t#GT#1: X(t) = X(t-1) + 
MA(t)*wA*step); 
  @FOR( time(t) | t#GT#1: Y(t) = Y(t-1) + 
MB(t)*wB*step); 
! The expected prices of A and B and the 
expected price difference are calculated; 
@FOR( time(t) | t#GT#1: EPA(t) = (PAM-
PAD)*x(t) + (PAM+PAD)*(1-x(t))); 
@FOR( time(t) | t#GT#1: EPB(t) = (PBM-
PBD)*y(t) + (PBM+PBD)*(1-y(t))); 
@FOR( time(t) | t#GT#1: EPDIFF(t) = EPA(t)-
EPB(t)); 
@for(time(t): @FREE(EPDIFF(t))); 
 
REFERENCES 
Aumann, R.J. & Hart, S. (1992) Handbook of 
Game Theory with Economic Applicat- 
ions. Amsterdam, North-Holland 1, 733 pp 
Aumann, R.J. & Hart, S. (1994) Handbook of 
Game Theory with Economic Applica- 
tions. Amsterdam, North-Holland 2, 786 
pp. 
Aumann, R.J. & Hart, S. (2002) Handbook of 
G a m e  T h e o r y  w i t h  E c o n o m i c  A p p l i c -  
ations. Amsterdam, North-Holland 3, 832 
pp. 
Bellman, R. (1953) On a new iterative 
algorithm for finding the solutions of 
games and linear programming problems. 
Research Memorandum, The RAND 
Corporation, Santa Monica. 473pp. 
Brown, G.W. & von Neumann, J. (1950) 
Solution of a game by differential 
equations. (Eds. H.W. Kuhn & A.W. 
Tucker). Contributions to the theory of   
games. Princeton University Press, Annals 
of Mathematics Studies. 24, 73–79. 
Carter, D.R. & Newman, D.H. (1998) The 
impact of reserve prices in sealed bid     
federal timber sale auctions. Forest Science. 
44, 485-495. 
Cournot, A.A. (1838) Recherches sur les 
principes mathe matiques de la theorie des 
Richesses. M. Riviere and Cie. Paris. 
Researches into the mathematical 
principles of wealth (English translation), 
A. M.Kelly, New York. 1960. 
Dresher, M. (1961) Games of strategy, theory 
and applications. Prentice-Hall. Flåm, S.D. 
(1990) Solving non-cooperative game by 
continuous subgradient   projection 
methods. (Eds. H.J. Sebastian & K. 
Tammer) System Modelling and 
Optimization.  Lecture notes in control and 
information sciences. 143, 123-155. 
Flåm, S.D. (1996) Approaches to economic 
equilibrium. Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control. 20, 1505-1522. 
Flåm, S.D. (1999) Learning equilibrium play: 
A myopic approach. Computational Optimi- 
zation and Applications. 14, 87-102. 
Flåm, S.D. (2002) Convexity, differential 
equations and games. Journal of Convex 
Analysis. 9, 429-438. 
Flåm, S.D. & Zaccour, G. (1991) Stochastic 
games, event-adapted equilibria and their 
Computation. University of Bergen, Depa- 
rtment of Economics, Norway. Report 91.  
Isaacs, R. (1965) Differential games, A 
mathematical theory with applications to 
warfare and pursuit, control and 
optimization. Wiley. 408pp. 
Kalai, E. & M. Smorodinsky. (1975) Other 
Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem.   
Econometrica. 43, 513-518. Mohammadi Limaei & Lohmander  71
Koskela, E. & Ollikainen, M. (1998) A game-
theoretic model of timber prices with 
capital stock: an empirical application to 
the Finnish pulp and paper industry. 
Canadian  Journal of Forest Research.  28, 
1481-1493. 
Lohmander, P. (1994) Expansion dynamics and 
noncooperative decisions in stochastic markets: 
Theory and pulp industry application. (Eds. F. 
Helles & M. Linddal). Scandinavian Forest 
Economics, Proceedings from the Scandi- 
navian Society of Forest Economics, 
Denmark, pp. 141-152. 
Lohmander, P. (1997) The constrained 
probability orbit of mixed strategy games 
with marginal adjustment: General theory 
and timber market application. System 
Analysis - Modelling – Simulation. 29, 27-55.  
Luce, R.D. & H. Raffia. (1957) Games and 
decisions, introduction and critical survey. 
Wiley. 509pp. 
Nash, J.F. (19500 The bargaining problem, 
Econometrica. 18, 155-62 
Neumann, J. & Morgenstern O. (1944) The 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. 
2nd edition. Princeton University Press. 
pp. 704. 
Rasmusen, E. (1990) Games and information, 
an introduction to game theory. Basil 
Blackwell. pp. 448. 
Robinson, J. (1951) An iterative method of 
solving a game. Annals of mathematics. 54, 
296-301. 
Schelling, T. (1960) Strategy of conflict.   
Harvard University Press. pp. 309. 
Selten, R. (1975) Reexamination of the 
perfectness concept for equilibrium points 
in extensive games. International Journal of 
Game Theory. 4, 25-55.  
von Neumann, J. (1954) A numerical method 
to determine optimum strategy. Naval 
Research Logistic Quarterly 1. 
von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern O. (1944) 
Theory of games and economic behavior.  
Princeton. pp. 704. 
von Stackelberg, H. (1934) Marketform und 
gleichgewicht. Wien. 
von Stackelberg, H. (1938) Probleme der 
unvollkommenen konkurens. Weltwirts- 
chaftlisches Arkiv. 48, 95-114. 
 